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The most important rule to determine payments in real-life bankruptcy problems
is the proportional rule. Many bankruptcy problems are characterized by network
aspects and default may occur as a result of contagion. Indeed, in financial networks
with defaulting agents, the values of the agents’ assets are endogenous as they depend
on the extent to which claims on other agents can be collected. These network
aspects make an axiomatic analysis challenging. This paper is the first to provide an
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1 Introduction
The principle of proportionality plays an important role in bankruptcy law across the globe.
The EC Council Regulation on insolvency proceedings states that1
Every creditor should be able to keep what he has received in the course of
insolvency proceedings but should be entitled only to participate in the distri-
bution of total assets in other proceedings if creditors with the same standing
have obtained the same proportion of their claims.
The principle of proportionality is also important for American bankruptcy law, according
to which claimants of equal status should receive payments proportional to the value of
their liabilities, see Kaminski (2000).
Given the prominence of the proportional rule in practice, it is important to understand
its crucial features by finding an axiomatization. Starting with the seminal paper of O’Neill
(1982), the literature that takes an axiomatic approach to the bankruptcy problem assumes
there is a single bankrupt agent while the other agents have claims on his estate. We refer
to this class of problems as claims problems. The central question is how this estate should
be divided over the claims and the axiomatic approach has provided firm underpinnings
for a number of well-known division rules. See Thomson (2003), Thomson (2013), and
Thomson (2015) for an overview of this stream of the literature.
Notable axiomatizations of the proportional rule for claims problems are given by Young
(1988), Moreno-Ternero (2006), Ju, Miyagawa, and Sakai (2007), and Thomson (2016)
by notions like self duality, composition up, composition down, non-manipulability and
merging-and splitting proofness. For related axiomatizations, see Tasna´di (2002) on prob-
abilistic rationing methods and Moulin (2016) on proportional assignment and rationing
of goods with different characteristics.
Recent crisis on financial markets related to the Lehman bankruptcy as well as sovereign
debt problems of European countries have spurred an extensive literature on systemic risk
that takes a network perspective to the bankruptcy problem, starting with the contribution
by Eisenberg and Noe (2001). The literature that is based on this model, either extending
it (Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin, 2005; Shin, 2008; Rogers and Veraart, 2013; Schulden-
zucker, Seuken, and Battiston, 2016), or using it to relate the number and magnitude
of defaults to the network topology (Gai and Kapadia, 2010; Elliott, Golub, and Jack-
son, 2014; Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015; Capponi, Chen, and Yao, 2013;
Glasserman and Young, 2015), or measuring systemic risk (Chen, Iyengar, and Moallemi,
2013; Demange, 2017) uses the proportional rule to determine the mutual payments by the
1Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings: http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02000R1346-20140709&qid=1471509284560
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agents. For an overview of this stream of the literature, we refer to the excellent survey by
Glasserman and Young (2016).
The aim of this paper is to provide axiomatic foundations for the use of the proportional
rule for bankruptcy problems in financial networks. A financial network consists of a set of
agents, with each agent being characterized by his endowments and his liabilities towards
the other agents. A bankruptcy rule determines the actual payments of agents to each
other, collected in a payment matrix. More technically, a bankruptcy rule is simply a
function that assigns to each financial network a payment matrix. To clearly distinguish
concepts, we use the terminology bankruptcy rule for financial network problems and
division rule for the simpler context of claims problems.
An agent is in fundamental default if he cannot fully pay his liabilities, even if he receives
full payments on all his claims from the other agents. In a network setting, a default can
also result from contagion, where an agent defaults only because other agents are not fully
paying their liabilities to him. Because of these mutual dependencies, it is not trivial to
define the proportional rule in a financial network and following the seminal contribution
by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) one proceeds as follows. First, one determines the asset
value of an agent, the value of his endowments together with the payments as collected
from the other agents. Under the proportional rule, an agent spends his asset value in a
proportional way over his liabilities, up to the value of those liabilities. Subtracting the
payments as made by an agent from his asset value yields an agent’s equity. Because of the
mutual dependencies caused by the network aspect, one has to solve a system of equations
to determine the actual payments. The agents’ asset values and equities are therefore
determined endogenously in a financial network using the proportional rule.
In real life, entities frequently merge or create spin-offs. When mergers or spin-offs do
not generate added value, they should not influence the payments made to and received
from agents not involved in them. The axiom which requires that the merger of a set of
agents or the split of an agent into multiple agents should not affect the payment matrix
is called non-manipulability.
The proportional rule does not satisfy non-manipulability. As an example, one expects
the merger of a bankrupt and a solvent agent to affect the payment matrix generated by
the proportional rule, since part of the assets of the solvent agent that were not seized
before can now be used for making payments related to claims on the bankrupt agent.
The other way around, if an agent is allowed to create a new entity that receives all its
liabilities but none of its claims or endowments, then the agent is clearly going to benefit
since it will end up in paying none of its liabilities. This kind of manipulation is illegal in
reality, since in winding up or in insolvency proceedings, the borrower is not allowed to do
anything that would threaten directly or indirectly the payments to its lenders.
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We show that non-manipulability is incompatible with any reasonable bankruptcy
rule in financial networks by proving that there is no bankruptcy rule satisfying non-
manipulability, claims boundedness, limited liability, and priority of creditors. Claims
boundedness expresses that no agent pays an amount in excess of his liabilities. A bankruptcy
rule satisfies limited liability if it leads to a payment matrix such that none of the agents
ends up with negative equity. Priority of creditors is satisfied if the only circumstance
under which an agent is allowed to default is when his equity is equal to zero. This im-
possibility result also shows financial networks to be quite different from claims problems,
where this form of non-manipulability is compatible with many division rules and has been
used by Moreno-Ternero (2006) and Ju, Miyagawa, and Sakai (2007) to axiomatize the
proportional rule.
We significantly weaken non-manipulability to non-manipulability by identical agents.
Agents are identical if they have the same endowments, claims, and liabilities. This is a
very strong requirement and implies, for instance, that the mutual liabilities of the identical
agents are equal to zero. Non-manipulability by identical agents requires that the merger
of a group of agents that are identical or the split of an agent into multiple identical agents
should not affect the payment matrix. Our other main substantive axiom is impartiality,
requiring that two agents with the same claim on an agent should receive the same payment
from him. We show that the two main axioms together with claims boundedness, limited
liability, priority of creditors, and impartiality it is shown to axiomatize the proportional
rule on the rational domain, i.e. the domain of financial networks with the values of all
primitives expressed by rational numbers. When the primitives of the financial network are
denoted in real numbers, we have to add continuity as an axiom to obtain an axiomatization
of the proportional rule.
The way the proportional rule for claims problems is extended to financial networks
can be used to extend any division rule. The resulting bankruptcy rules consist of com-
puting each agent’s asset value and then making payments in accordance with the given
division rule. Although clearing payment matrices in financial networks are unique when
proportional division rules are used, this is not the case in general. Adapting the proof of
Cso´ka and Herings (2016) for the discrete case, we show that there exists a least clearing
payment matrix and a greatest clearing payment matrix. We select the greatest clearing
payment matrix to define the bankruptcy rule and formulate a programming problem to
calculate it.
In the demonstration that our axioms are independent, we show the surprising result
that the constrained equal awards rule for financial networks does not satisfy continuity,
whereas the constrained equal losses rule does. Under the constrained equal awards division
rule, for a recent axiomatization of its weighted version see Flores-Szwagrzak (2015), all
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claimants get the same amount, up to the value of their claim. The constrained equal
losses division rule is its dual and imposes that all claimants face the same loss, up to the
value of their claim. We show that constrained equal losses division rules lead to unique
clearing payment matrices, but constrained equal awards division rules do not.
Groote Schaarsberg, Reijnierse, and Borm (2013) also extend division rules for claims
problems to financial networks, but focus on the resulting equity rather than payment
matrices. They show that equity is uniquely determined and they characterize equity
corresponding to the Aumann-Maschler division rule within the class of division rule based
bankruptcy rules.
Not all bankruptcy rules are based on division rules. For instance, a bankruptcy rule
that consists of pairwise netting all mutual claims first and next applying the proportional
rule to the resulting liabilities is not in this class, since in this case payments do not only
depend on the asset value of an agent and his liabilities, but also on his claims towards
other agents. Our axiomatization does not impose any a priori structure on bankruptcy
rules. Absence of pairwise netting, for instance, is therefore a consequence of our axioms
rather than an assumption.
Finally, we would like to mention an emerging literature on the extension of the
bankruptcy literature to network problems as appearing in operations research. Bjørndal
and Jo¨rnsten (2010) analyze generalized bankruptcy problems with multiple estates as flow
sharing problems and define the nucleolus and the constrained egalitarian solution for such
problems. Moulin and Sethuraman (2013) consider bipartite rationing problems, where
agents can have claims on a subset of unrelated estates. They consider whether rules for
single resource problems can be consistently extended to their framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines financial networks and
the proportional and the pairwise netting proportional rules. Section 3 defines our axioms
and discusses non-manipulability in particular. Section 4 provides our axiomatization
result on the rational domain. In Section 5, we define bankruptcy rules that are based on
division rules and pay particular attention to the constrained equal awards and constrained
equal losses rules. In Section 7 we introduce the axiom of continuity and provide the
axiomatization on the real domain. Section 8 concludes.
2 Financial Networks
Let N be the set of all potential agents and N the collection of non-empty, finite subsets
of N.
A financial network is a triple (N, z, L) with the following interpretation.
The set of agents in the financial network is given by N ∈ N .
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The vector z ∈ QN++ represents the endowments of the agents, which are strictly positive
rational numbers. The endowment of an agent includes all his tangible and intangible
assets, but excludes the claims and liabilities the agent has towards the other agents. In
the main part of the paper, we assume that all endowments, claims, and liabilities are
expressed as rational numbers, unless explicitly noted otherwise. At the end of the paper,
we treat the real-valued case.
The non-negative liability matrix L ∈ QN×N+ describes the mutual claims of the agents.
Its entry Lij is the liability of agent i towards agent j or, equivalently, the claim of agent j
on agent i. We make the normalizing assumption that Lii = 0. In general, it can occur that
agent i has a liability towards agent j and vice versa, so it may happen that simultaneously
Lij > 0 and Lji > 0.
The set of all matrices in QN×N+ with a zero diagonal is denoted by M(N). The union
over all finite sets of agents of these matrices is denoted byM = ∪N∈NM(N). The partial
order ≤ on M(N) is defined in the usual way: For P, P ′ ∈ M(N) it holds that P ≤ P ′ if
and only if Pij ≤ P ′ij for all (i, j) ∈ N ×N. For P ∈M(N) and i ∈ N , let Pi ∈ QN denote
row i of P . For Pi, P
′
i ∈ QN , we write Pi < P ′i if Pij ≤ P ′ij for all j ∈ N and there is k ∈ N
such that Pik < P
′
ik. Column i ∈ N of the matrix P is denoted by P i.
The set of all financial networks is denoted by F .
Consider a financial network (N, z, L) ∈ F . A payment matrix P ∈ M(N) describes
the mutual payments to be made by the agents, that is, Pij is the monetary amount to be
paid by agent i ∈ N to agent j ∈ N . Given a payment matrix P ∈M(N), the asset value
ai(N, z, P ) of agent i ∈ N is given by
ai(N, z, P ) = zi +
∑
j∈N
Pji.
Subtracting the payments as made by an agent from his asset value yields an agent’s equity.
The equity ei(N, z, P ) of an agent i ∈ N is given by
ei(N, z, P ) = ai(N, z, P )−
∑
j∈N
Pij = zi +
∑
j∈N
(Pji − Pij).
It follows immediately from the above expression that the sum over agents of their equities
is the same as the sum over agents of their initial endowments.
A bankruptcy rule b associates to each financial network (N, z, L) ∈ F a payment
matrix P ∈M(N). More formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 2.1. A bankruptcy rule is a function b : F →M such that for every (N, z, L) ∈
F it holds that b(N, z, L) ∈M(N).
The analysis of financial networks is complicated because of the mutual liability struc-
ture and the contagion effects of default. A much simpler framework is provided by the
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frequently studied class of claims problems. In such a problem, an estate E ∈ Q+ has to
be divided over a set of claimants N ∈ N having a vector of claims c ∈ QN+ . To clearly
distinguish concepts, we use the terminology division rule rather than bankruptcy rule in
the context of claims problems. The proportional division rule dp : Q+×QN+ → QN+ assigns
to claimant j ∈ N the amount
dpj (E, c) =
{
0, if cj = 0,
min{ cj∑
k∈N ck
E, cj}, otherwise.
Under the proportional division rule, the estate is divided in a proportional way over
the claimants, up to the value of those claims.
For financial networks, the proportional rule p : F → M is the bankruptcy rule that
takes for every agent the value of the estate equal to his asset value and next uses the
proportional division rule to spend his asset value in a proportional way over his liabilities.
Definition 2.2. The proportional rule is the function p : F → M such that for every
(N, z, L) ∈ F it holds that p(N, z, L) = P, where P solves the following system of equations:
Pij = d
p
j (ai(N, z, P ), Li), i, j ∈ N. (2.1)
In system of equations (2.1) agent i is treated as a claimant on his own estate ai(N, z, P )
with a claim equal to Lii = 0 and therefore receives a payment from himself equal to zero.
Using the definition of dpj (ai(N, z, P ), Li), we can write the system of equations in (2.1)
more explicitly as the following system of equations for i, j ∈ N,
Pij =
{
0, if Lij = 0,
min{ Lij∑
k∈N Lik
ai(N, z, P ), Lij}, otherwise. (2.2)
The next theorem states that the system of equations (2.2) has a unique solution and it
belongs to the rational payment matricesM(N), so the proportional rule p is well-defined
by (2.1).
Theorem 2.3. Let (N, z, L) ∈ F be a financial network. The system of equations (2.2)
has a unique solution and the solution belongs to M(N).
Proof. It follows from Theorem 2 in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) that the system of
equations (2.2) has a unique real-valued solution, say P. It therefore remains to be shown
that each entry of this matrix belongs to Q.
Let i ∈ N be such that Pi = Li. Since Li ∈ QN , it follows trivially that Pi ∈ QN .
Let D ⊂ N be the set of defaulting agents, so D = {i ∈ N | Pi < Li}. For every i ∈ D,
we define the fraction of liabilities λi ∈ (0, 1) that is paid by
λi =
∑
j∈N Pij∑
j∈N Lij
. (2.3)
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Notice that i ∈ D implies ∑j∈N Lij > 0, so the denominator in (2.3) is well-defined
and there is a one-one correspondence between λi and the payments Pi of agent i. Since
endowments are strictly positive, it holds that λi > 0 for every i ∈ D.
For every i ∈ D we have that ei(N, z, P ) = 0, since in this case Pij = Lij∑
k∈N Lik
ai(N, z, P )
for all j ∈ N , implying that ∑j∈N Pij = ai(N, z, P ). Thus λi is the unique solution to the
following system of equations:
(
∑
j∈N
Lij)λi −
∑
j∈D
Ljiλj = zi +
∑
j∈N\D
Lji, i ∈ D.
Since this is a linear system of equations in λ with a unique solution and all the coefficients
are rational, it follows that the solution must be rational too. 2
Section 5 discusses how division rules for claims problems can be turned into bankruptcy
rules for financial networks more generally.
The proof above implies that the payments made under the proportional rule p in the
financial network F = (N, z, L) ∈ F satisfy three properties. First, for every i ∈ N,
there is λi ∈ Q+ ∩ (0, 1] such that row i of the payment matrix pi(F ) = λiLi. Here λi
is the fraction of agent i’s liabilities that is going to be paid. Second, bankrupt and of
course also solvent agents should not end up with negative equity, so for every i ∈ N,
ei(N, z, p(F )) ≥ 0. Finally, an agent is not allowed to default when having positive equity:
pi(F ) < Li implies ei(N, z, p(F )) = 0. Taking these three properties into account, the
payment matrix generated by the proportional rule can also be found as the solution to
a linear programming problem. The linear programming formulation will turn out to be
very useful in several of the proofs. Let 1 denote a vector of ones of appropriate dimension.
Theorem 2.4 (Eisenberg and Noe (2001)). Let (N, z, L) ∈ F be a financial network and
let P ′ solve the following linear programming problem:
maxP∈RN×N+ ,λ∈RN+
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N Pij,
subject to
Pij = λiLij, i, j ∈ N,
λi ≤ 1, i ∈ N,
z + P>1− P1 ≥ 0.
(2.4)
Then it holds that p(N, z, L) = P ′.
This result is presented as Lemma 4 in Eisenberg and Noe (2001). The first and second
constraint in the linear program (2.4) guarantee that payments are proportional to the
liabilities and that no agent receives more than his claim. The third constraint ensures
7
that no agent ends up with negative equity. The property that an agent is not allowed to
default when having positive equity follows from the fact that the solution maximizes the
objective function. Otherwise, it would be possible to increase the value of the objective
function by having the defaulting agent make additional payments.
An alternative to the proportional rule is to first revise the claims by doing a round
of pairwise netting and by next applying the proportional rule to the financial networks
with the revised claims. The revised claims have the property that for every pair of agents
i, j ∈ N it holds that Lij = 0 or Lji = 0.
Definition 2.5. The pairwise netting proportional rule is the function pnp : F →M, such
that, for every (N, z, L) ∈ F ,
pnp(N, z, L) = min{L,L>}+ p(N, z, L−min{L,L>}). (2.5)
Under the pairwise netting proportional rule, first pairwise mutual payments are made
resulting in pairwise netting of the liabilities, and next the remaining liabilities are settled
using the proportional rule. Since both the matrix of pairwise mutual payments min{L,L>}
and the revised matrix of liabilities L−min{L,L>} belong to the rational payment matrices
M(N), and the proportional rule p leads to a payment matrix p(N, z, L) in M(N), also
the payments made under the pairwise netting proportional rule pnp belong to M(N).
Notice that the expression in (2.5) can also be written as
pnp(N, z, L) = min{L,L>}+ p(N, z,max{0, L− L>}).
In the following example, we illustrate that the proportional rule and the pairwise net-
ting proportional rule may lead to different asset values and equities in financial networks.
Example 2.6. Consider the financial network (N, z, L) ∈ F with three agents N =
{1, 2, 3} and endowments and liabilities as in Table 1. Table 2 presents the payment
matrix P resulting from the proportional rule p and the induced asset values and equities.
Table 3 presents the pairwise netting amounts min{L,L>}, the payment matrix resulting
from the proportional rule applied to the revised problem P ′ = p(N, z, L − min{L,L>}),
the payment matrix P , asset values a(P ), and equities e(P ) resulting from the pairwise
netting proportional rule pnp.
The payment matrices P and P lead to different equities for agents 2 and 3. The reason
is that the pairwise netting between agents 1 and 2 is equivalent to a full reimbursement
of half the liability of agent 1 to agent 2. To the remaining liability of agent 1 to agent 2
and the liability of agent 1 to agent 3, the proportional rule is applied. Altogether this
is better for agent 2 than applying the proportional rule to his entire claim on agent 1.
The pairwise netting proportional rule has the undesirable feature that agent 1 makes a
payment of 10 units to agent 2 and of 8 units to agent 3, even though both agents hold
the same claim against agent 1.
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z L
12 0 12 12
6 6 0 0
6 0 0 0
Table 1: The endowments and liabilities in Example 2.6.
z L P a(N, z, P ) e(N, z, P )
12 0 12 12 0 9 9 18 0
6 6 0 0 6 0 0 15 9
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 15
Table 2: The payment matrix, asset values and equities resulting from the proportional
rule p in Example 2.6.
z L L′ min{L,L>} P ′ P a(N, z, P ) e(N, z, P )
12 0 12 12 0 6 12 0 6 0 0 4 8 0 10 8 18 0
6 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 16 10
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14
L′ = L−min{L,L>}
P ′ = p(N, z, L−min{L,L>})
Table 3: The pairwise netting amounts min{L,L>}, the payment matrix of the revised
problem P ′, the payment matrix P , asset values a(P ) and equities e(P ) resulting from the
pairwise netting proportional rule pnp in Example 2.6.
3 Axioms
In this section we define and discuss the set of axioms characterizing the proportional rule in
financial networks: claims boundedness, limited liability, priority of creditors, impartiality,
and non-manipulability by identical agents.
Definition 3.1. A bankruptcy rule b : F → M satisfies claims boundedness (B) if for
every F = (N, z, L) ∈ F it holds that b(F ) ≤ L.
Claims boundedness expresses that no agent needs to pay an amount in excess of his
liabilities.
Definition 3.2. A bankruptcy rule b : F → M satisfies limited liability (L) if for every
F = (N, z, L) ∈ F , for every i ∈ N, we have that ei(N, z, b(F )) ≥ 0.
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A bankruptcy rule satisfies limited liability if it leads to a payment matrix such that
none of the agents ends up with negative equity.
Definition 3.3. A bankruptcy rule b : F → M satisfies priority of creditors (P) if for
every F = (N, z, L) ∈ F , for every i ∈ N, if bi(F ) < Li, then ei(N, z, b(F )) = 0.
A bankruptcy rule satisfies priority of creditors if the only circumstance under which an
agent is allowed to default is when his equity is equal to zero. The axioms of limited liability
and priority of creditors are closely related to the notions of limited liability and absolute
priority as introduced in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) in the context of the proportional rule.
In Eisenberg and Noe (2001), limited liability and absolute priority are not formulated as
properties of bankruptcy rules, but as requirements on the payment matrix following from
proportional division rules.
Definition 3.4. A bankruptcy rule b : F → M satisfies impartiality (I) if for every
F = (N, z, L) ∈ F , for every i, j, k ∈ N such that Lij = Lik, it holds that bij(F ) = bik(F ).
Impartiality requires that two agents j and k with the same claim on agent i should
receive the same payment from i. It follows from Example 2.6 that Axiom I is not satisfied
by the pairwise netting proportional rule, since there agent 1 makes a payment of 10 units
to agent 2 and of 8 units to agent 3, even though both agents hold the same claim against
agent 1.
For the class of claims problems, non-manipulability says that no group of agents can
increase their total awards by merging their claims and that no single agent can increase his
award by splitting his claim among dummy agents and himself. This axiom was introduced
as strategy-proofness by O’Neill (1982). Strong non-manipulability, introduced as the
additivity of claims property by Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs (1987), says that if an agent
splits his claim and appears as several different claimants, or a group of agents merge their
claims and appear as a single claimant, nothing changes for the other agents involved in
the problem.
Our next axiom generalizes strong non-manipulability for claims problems to the setting
of financial networks. Let a financial network F = (N, z, L) ∈ F , an agent j ∈ N , and a
set of agents K ⊂ N \ {j} be given. The financial network F ′ = (N ′, z′, L′) that results
after a take-over by agent j ∈ N of the endowments, claims, and liabilities of the agents
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in the set K ⊂ N \ {j} is denoted by T (F, j,K), so
N ′ = N \K,
z′j = zj +
∑
k∈K zk,
z′i = zi, i ∈ N ′ \ {j},
L′ji = Lji +
∑
k∈K Lki, i ∈ N ′ \ {j},
L′ij = Lij +
∑
k∈K Lik, i ∈ N ′ \ {j},
L′hi = Lhi, h, i ∈ N ′ \ {j}.
We define the axiom of non-manipulability for financial networks in the following way.
Definition 3.5. A bankruptcy rule b : F → M satisfies non-manipulability if for every
F = (N, z, L) ∈ F , for every j ∈ N, for every K ⊂ N \ {j}, the payments in the financial
network F ′ = (N ′, z′, L′) = T (F, j,K) satisfy
bji(F
′) = bji(F ) +
∑
k∈K bki(F ), i ∈ N ′ \ {j},
bij(F
′) = bij(F ) +
∑
k∈K bik(F ), i ∈ N ′ \ {j},
bhi(F
′) = bhi(F ), h, i ∈ N ′ \ {j}.
We have formulated non-manipulability as the requirement that the merger of a set of
agents should not affect the payments made to and received from the agents that are not
involved in the merger. Equivalently, we could have used the formulation that splitting
an agent into multiple agents should not affect the payments made to and received from
the agents that are not involved in the split. Another way to look at the definition is
that under a non-manipulable bankruptcy rule, involved agents do neither benefit from a
take-over nor from a split, giving two inequalities which result in the first two equalities
in Definition 3.5. The feature that also mutual payments between agents not involved in
the take-over or split do not change, the third line of equalities in Definition 3.5, makes
this notion of non-manipulability particularly robust, since it rules out the possibility that
agents outside a take-over or split would benefit from it and would be willing to make
side-payments to induce it. To sum up, non-manipulability requires the merger of a set of
agents or the split of an agent into multiple agents not to affect the payment matrix.
Although seemingly attractive, we argue next that the requirement of non-manipulability
is too strong in financial networks. First, we show that it is not satisfied by the proportional
rule.
Example 3.6. We start from the financial network F = (N, z, L) ∈ F of Example 2.6,
presented in Table 4 for convenience.
Consider a split of agent 1 into agents 1 and 4, resulting in the financial network
F ′ = (N ′, z′, L′) = (N ∪ {4}, z′, L′). In the split, agent 1 allocates half of his endowment
and all of his liabilities to agent 4, but none of his claims. The financial network F ′ is
11
z L P a(N, z, P ) e(N, z, P )
12 0 12 12 0 9 9 18 0
6 6 0 0 6 0 0 15 9
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 15
Table 4: The payment matrix, asset values, and equities resulting from the proportional
rule p in Example 3.6 for the financial network F = (N, z, L).
presented in Table 5, as well as the payment matrix P ′ resulting from the proportional rule
p. Notice that F = T (F ′, 1, {4}).
z′ L′ P ′ a(N ′, z′, P ′) e(N ′, z′, P ′)
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 12
6 6 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 9 3
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9
6 0 12 12 0 0 3 3 0 6 0
Table 5: The payment matrix, asset values, and equities resulting from the proportional
rule p in Example 3.6 for the financial network F ′ = (N ′, z′, L′).
Clearly, the proportional rule violates non-manipulability, since P12 = 9 6= 3 = P ′12+P ′42
and P13 = 9 6= 3 = P ′13 + P ′43. Agent 4 has no claims and his liabilities exceed his endow-
ment, so is sure to default on his liabilities. On the other hand, agent 1 has no liabilities, a
positive endowment, and positive claims, so will be solvent for sure. Agent 1, who defaults
in financial network F and has e1(N, z, p(F )) = 0, has splitted in a solvent agent 1 and a
defaulting agent 4 in financial network F ′ with resulting equity e1(N ′, z′, p(F ′)) = 12 and
e4(N
′, z′, p(F ′)) = 0. Obviously, if a bankrupt agent is allowed to allocate all his liabilities
to a spin-off and keeps his endowment and claims to himself, he will end up with positive
equity himself and a bankrupt spin-off. This kind of manipulation is illegal, since in wind-
ing up or in insolvency proceedings, the borrower is not allowed to do anything that would
threaten directly or indirectly the payments to its lenders.
We can generalize the findings of Example 3.6 to the following impossibility result.
Theorem 3.7. There is no bankruptcy rule satisfying claims boundedness (B), limited
liability (L), priority of creditors (P), and non-manipulability.
Proof. Suppose b is a bankruptcy rule satisfying B, L, P, and non-manipulability. Let
F and F ′ be the financial networks as defined in Example 3.6. We define P = b(F ) and
P ′ = b(F ′).
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By B it holds that
P ′1 = (0, 0, 0, 0) (3.1)
and
e4(N
′, z′, P ′) = z′4 +
∑
i∈N ′
P ′i4 −
∑
i∈N ′
P ′4i = 6−
∑
i∈N ′
P ′4i.
If P ′4 = L4, then evidently e4(N
′, z′, P ′) < 0, which would violate L. It therefore holds that
P ′4 6= L4 and by B that P ′4 < L4. Axiom P now implies that
∑
i∈N ′ P
′
4i = 6. Axiom B
implies P ′41 = 0.
We now apply non-manipulability to derive that
P12 = P
′
12 + P
′
42,
P13 = P
′
13 + P
′
43,
so ∑
i∈N
P1i = P11 + P12 + P13 = 0 + P
′
12 + P
′
42 + P
′
13 + P
′
43 =
∑
i∈N
P ′1i +
∑
i∈N
P ′4i = 6, (3.2)
where the last equality comes from (3.1). It follows that
e1(N, z, P ) = z1 +
∑
i∈N
Pi1 −
∑
i∈N
P1i ≥ 12 + 0− 6 = 6 > 0,
so P and B yields P1 = L1 and∑
i∈N
P1i =
∑
i∈N
L1i = 24,
a contradiction to (3.2). 2
We therefore impose the much weaker axiom of non-manipulability by identical agents,
which requires that the merger of a group of agents that are identical, that is, have the
same endowments, claims, and liabilities, should not affect the payments made to and
received by the agents not involved in the merger, formally defined as follows.
Definition 3.8. A bankruptcy rule b : F → M satisfies non-manipulability by identical
agents (N) if for every F = (N, z, L) ∈ F , for every j ∈ N, for every K ⊂ N \{j} such that
for all k ∈ K we have that zk = zj, Lk = Lj, and Lk = Lj, the payments in the financial
network F ′ = (N ′, z′, L′) = T (F, j,K) satisfy
bji(F
′) = bji(F ) +
∑
k∈K bki(F ), i ∈ N ′ \ {j},
bij(F
′) = bij(F ) +
∑
k∈K bik(F ), i ∈ N ′ \ {j},
bhi(F
′) = bhi(F ), h, i ∈ N ′ \ {j}.
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When using non-manipulability by identical agents, all agents k ∈ K should be identical
to agent j, that is, they should have the same endowment, claim, and liability vector. Since
Ljj = 0 and Lkk = 0, the requirement Lj = Lk implies Ljk = Lkj = 0. More generally, the
same argument can be used to derive that
Lk` = 0, k, ` ∈ {{j} ∪K}. (3.3)
The inequalities resulting from the requirement that a set of identical agents does
not benefit from a merger and the requirement that an agent should not benefit from
splitting into multiple identical agents can be reduced to the first two sets of equalities
in Definition 3.8. The third set of equalities requires that also mutual payments between
agents not involved in the merger or split should not change. To sum up, Axiom N requires
that the merger of a group of agents that are identical or the split of an agent into multiple
identical agents should not affect the payment matrix.
4 The Axiomatization on the Rational Domain
In this section, we show that the axioms of claims boundedness (B), limited liability (L),
priority of creditors (P), impartiality (I), and non-manipulability by identical agents (N)
characterize the proportional rule in financial networks. First, we show that for any finan-
cial network the proportional rule satisfies those axioms.
Theorem 4.1. The proportional rule p satisfies B, L, P, I, and N.
Proof. Consider the constraints in the linear programming formulation of the propor-
tional rule in Theorem 2.4. Since, for every i ∈ N, λi ≤ 1, it holds that B is satisfied. The
constraint z+P>1−P1 ≥ 0 implies that L holds. Since, for every i, j ∈ N, the constraint
Pij = λiLij is imposed, Axiom I follows.
Next, we show Axiom P to hold. Take any financial network F = (N, z, L) ∈ F and
any agent i ∈ N such that pi(F ) < Li. Then, by the system of equations (2.2), we have
that
pij(F ) =
Lij∑
k∈N Lik
ai(N, z, p(F )),
so ∑
j∈N
pij(F ) =
∑
j∈N
Lij∑
k∈N Lik
ai(N, z, p(F )) = ai(N, z, p(F )),
implying that ei(N, z, p(F )) = 0.
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To show Axiom N holds, take any financial network F = (N, z, L) ∈ F , j ∈ N, and
K ⊂ N \ {j} such that
zj = zk, Lj = Lk, L
j = Lk, k ∈ K, (4.1)
implying, see (3.3), that there are no liabilities among agents in {j} ∪K,
Lk` = 0, k, ` ∈ {j} ∪K. (4.2)
Consider the financial network F ′ = (N ′, z′, L′) = T (F, j,K). We show that the pay-
ment matrix P ′ ∈M(N ′) defined by
P ′ji = pji(F ) +
∑
k∈K pki(F ), i ∈ N ′ \ {j},
P ′ij = pij(F ) +
∑
k∈K pik(F ), i ∈ N ′ \ {j},
P ′hi = phi(F ), h, i ∈ N ′ \ {j},
(4.3)
is a solution to (2.2) in Definition 2.2 for F ′. We have two main cases, 1 and 2, depending
on whether the liability between a pair of agents is zero or not, and we have three subcases,
a, b, and c, depending on the row in (4.3) under consideration.
Case 1a: i ∈ N ′ \ {j}, L′ji = 0.
We have to show that P ′ji = 0. It holds that
0 = L′ji = Lji +
∑
k∈K
Lki,
so Lji = 0 and, for every k ∈ K, Lki = 0. This implies that
P ′ji = pji(F ) +
∑
k∈K
pki(F ) = 0,
where the first equality uses (4.3) and the second (2.2).
Case 1b: i ∈ N ′ \ {j}, L′ij = 0.
We have to show that P ′ij = 0. It holds that
0 = L′ij = Lij +
∑
k∈K
Lik,
so Lij = 0 and, for every k ∈ K, Lik = 0. This implies that
P ′ij = pij(F ) +
∑
k∈K
pik(F ) = 0,
where the first equality uses (4.3) and the second (2.2).
Case 1c: h, i ∈ N ′ \ {j}, L′hi = 0.
We have to show that P ′hi = 0. It holds that Lhi = L
′
hi = 0, so P
′
hi = phi(F ) = 0, where
the first equality uses (4.3) and the second (2.2).
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Case 2a: i ∈ N ′ \ {j}, L′ji > 0.
It holds that
L′ji = Lji +
∑
k∈K
Lki > 0.
Since for all k ∈ K we have that Lj = Lk by (4.1), it follows that Lj = Lk > 0 for all
k ∈ K. Hence we are in the second case of (2.2) and by (4.3) we have that
P ′ji= pji(F ) +
∑
k∈K
pki(F )
= min
{
Lji∑
h∈N Ljh
aj(N, z, p(F )), Lji
}
+
∑
k∈K
min
{
Lki∑
h∈N Lkh
ak(N, z, p(F )), Lki
}
.(4.4)
We have to show that
P ′ji = min
{
L′ji∑
h∈N′ L
′
jh
aj(N
′, z′, P ′), L′ji
}
. (4.5)
Observe that for every k ∈ K
ak(N, z, p(F )) = zk +
∑
h∈N
phk(F ) = zj +
∑
h∈N
phj(F ) = aj(N, z, p(F )), (4.6)
where the second equality follows from the fact that the agents in {j} ∪K have the same
endowments and claims by (4.1) and receive the same payments since the proportional rule
satisfies I. Moreover, the agents in {j} ∪K have the same liabilities in F by (4.1), hence∑
h∈N Ljh =
∑
h∈N Lkh, and (4.4) can be written as
P ′ji = (|K|+ 1) min
{
Lji∑
h∈N Ljh
aj(N, z, p(F )), Lji
}
. (4.7)
Note that, for every h ∈ N ′, it holds by (4.3) that
P ′hj = phj(F ) +
∑
k∈K
phk(F ) = (|K|+ 1)phj(F ), (4.8)
since the agents in {j}∪K have the same claims by (4.1) and the proportional rule satisfies
I. By (4.1), it follows that
(|K|+ 1)Lji = L′ji, (4.9)
(|K|+ 1)zj = z′j. (4.10)
By (4.2) and since p satisfies L, we have that
aj(N, z, p(F )) = zj +
∑
h∈N
phj(F ) = zj +
∑
h∈N ′
phj(F ).
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Using this fact, (4.2), (4.8), (4.9), and (4.10), we can rewrite (4.7) as
P ′ji = min
{
L′ji
1
|K|+1
∑
h∈N ′ L
′
jh
(
1
|K|+ 1z
′
j +
1
|K|+ 1
∑
h∈N ′
P ′hj
)
, L′ji
}
= min
{
L′ji∑
h∈N ′ L
′
jh
(
z′j +
∑
h∈N ′
P ′hj
)
, L′ji
}
,
thus (4.5) is satisfied.
Case 2b: i ∈ N ′ \ {j}, L′ij > 0.
It holds that
L′ij = Lij +
∑
k∈K
Lik > 0.
Since for all k ∈ K we have that Lj = Lk by (4.1), it follows that Lj = Lk > 0 for all
k ∈ K. Hence we are in the second case of (2.2) and by (4.3) we have that
P ′ij = pij(F ) +
∑
k∈K
pik(F )
= min
{
Lij∑
h∈N Lih
ai(N, z, p(F )), Lij
}
+
∑
k∈K
min
{
Lik∑
h∈N Lih
ai(N, z, p(F )), Lik
}
= (|K|+ 1) min
{
Lij∑
h∈N Lih
ai(N, z, p(F )), Lij
}
, (4.11)
where the last equality follows from the fact that by (4.1) we have that Lij = Lik for all
k ∈ K.
We have to show that
P ′ij = min
{
L′ij∑
h∈N′ L
′
ih
ai(N
′, z′, P ′), L′ij
}
. (4.12)
By (4.1) it follows that
(|K|+ 1)Lij = L′ij. (4.13)
It holds that
ai(N, z, p(F )) = zi +
∑
h∈N
phi(F ) = z
′
i +
∑
h∈N ′
P ′hi = ai(N
′, z′, P ′), (4.14)
where we use zi = z
′
i by (4.1) and the first and third case of (4.3) to derive the second
equality. By definition of F ′ it follows that∑
h∈N
Lih =
∑
h∈N ′
L′ih. (4.15)
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Combining (4.11) with (4.13), (4.14), and (4.15), we obtain (4.12).
Case 2c: h, i ∈ N ′ \ {j}, L′hi > 0.
It holds that L′hi = Lhi > 0. Hence, we are in the second case of (2.2) and by (4.3) it holds
that
P ′hi = phi(F )
= min
{
Lhi∑
g∈N Lhg
ah(N, z, p(F )), Lhi
}
= min
{
L′hi∑
g∈N ′ L
′
hg
ah(N
′, z′, P ′), L′hi
}
,
where the third equality follows from L′hi = Lhi, (4.14), and (4.15). 2
To show that the axioms of B, L, P, I, and N imply the proportional rule, we will use
the following two lemmas. Lemma 4.2 considers the case where one liability of an agent is
an integer multiple of another liability.
Lemma 4.2. Let F = (N, z, L) ∈ F be a financial network and let i, j, k ∈ N be such that
qLij = Lik for some integer q ≥ 2. Let b be a bankruptcy rule satisfying axioms I and N.
Then we have qbij(F ) = bik(F ).
Proof. Let F ′ = (N ′, z′, L′) ∈ F be the financial network where agent k is splitted into
q identical agents k and `1, . . . , `q−1 ∈ N \N, more precisely
N ′ = N ∪ {`1, . . . , `q−1},
z′k = z
′
`1
= · · · = z′`q−1 = zk/q,
L′ik = L
′
i`1
= · · · = L′i`q−1 = Lik/q, i ∈ N \ {k},
L′ki = L
′
`1i
= · · · = L′`q−1i = Lki/q, i ∈ N \ {k},
L′ij = 0, i, j ∈ {k, `1, . . . , `q−1},
z′i = zi, i ∈ N \ {k},
L′ij = Lij, i, j ∈ N \ {k}.
Notice that F = T (F ′, k, {`1, . . . , `q−1}). Then we have that
bik(F ) = qbik(F
′) = qbij(F ′) = qbij(F ),
where the first equality follows by Axiom N, the second equality by I, and the third equality
again by N. 2
The next lemma treats the case where one liability of an agent is an arbitrary multiple
of another liability.
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Lemma 4.3. Let F = (N, z, L) ∈ F be a financial network and let i, j, k ∈ N and q, r ∈ N
be such that Lij = (q/r)Lik. Let b be a bankruptcy rule satisfying I and N. Then we have
bij(F ) = (q/r)bik(F ).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume q < r. Let F ′ = (N ′, z′, L′) ∈ F be the
financial network where agent k is splitted into r identical agents k and `1, . . . , `r−1, more
precisely
N ′ = N ∪ {`1, . . . , `r−1},
z′k = z
′
`1
= · · · = z′`r−1 = zk/r,
L′ik = L
′
i`1
= · · · = L′i`r−1 = Lik/r, i ∈ N \ {k},
L′ki = L
′
`1i
= · · · = L′`r−1i = Lki/r, i ∈ N \ {k},
L′ij = 0, i, j ∈ {k, `1, . . . , `r−1},
z′i = zi, i ∈ N \ {k},
L′ij = Lij, i, j ∈ N \ {k}.
Notice that F = T (F ′, k, {`1, . . . , `r−1}). Then we have that
bik(F ) = rbik(F
′) = r
q
bij(F
′) = r
q
bij(F ),
where the first equality follows by Axiom N, the second equality by Lemma 4.2, and the
third equality again by Axiom N. 2
The following theorem characterizes the proportional rule as the only bankruptcy rule
satisfying B, L, P, I, and N.
Theorem 4.4. If the bankruptcy rule b satisfies B, L, P, I, and N, then b = p.
Proof. Let F = (N, z, L) ∈ F be a financial network and let b be a bankruptcy rule
satisfying B, L, P, I, and N. We show that b(P ) is a solution to the system of equations
(2.2). We consider two main cases.
Case 1: i, j ∈ N, Lij = 0.
By B we have that bij(F ) ≤ 0 and from b(F ) ∈M(N) we get that bij(F ) = 0.
Case 2: i, j ∈ N, Lij > 0.
We have to show that
bij(F ) = min
{
Lij∑
k∈N Lik
ai(N, z, b(F )), Lij
}
.
Case 2a: ai(N, z, b(F )) ≥
∑
k∈N Lik.
We have to show that bij(F ) = Lij. Suppose, on the contrary, that bij(F ) 6= Lij. Then by
B we have that
bij(F ) < Lij. (4.16)
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By Axiom P, the assumption of Case 2a, Axiom B, and (4.16) we get that
0 = ei(N, z, b(F )) = ai(N, z, b(F ))−
∑
k∈Nbik(F ) >
∑
k∈NLik −
∑
k∈NLik = 0, (4.17)
a contradiction. Consequently, it holds that bij(F ) = Lij.
Case 2b: ai(N, z, b(F )) <
∑
k∈N Lik.
We have to show that
bij(F ) =
Lij∑
k∈N Lik
ai(N, z, b(F )). (4.18)
By Lemma 4.3 there exists pii ≥ 0 such that for all k ∈ N we have that
bik(F ) = piiLik. (4.19)
Thus we have to show that
pii =
ai(N, z, b(F ))∑
k∈N Lik
. (4.20)
By L we have that∑
k∈N
bik(F ) ≤ ai(N, z, b(F )). (4.21)
Suppose that∑
k∈N
bik(F ) < ai(N, z, b(F )). (4.22)
Then ei(N, z, b(F )) > 0 and P implies that
∑
k∈N bik =
∑
k∈N Lik, a contradiction to the
assumption of Case 2b and (4.22). Consequently, (4.21) holds with equality and by (4.19)
we have that
ai(N, z, b(F )) =
∑
k∈N
bik(F ) =
∑
k∈N
piiLik = pii
∑
k∈N
Lik, (4.23)
implying (4.20) as desired. 2
By combining Theorems 4.1 and 4.4 we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.5. The proportional rule p is the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying the axioms
of B, L, P, I, and N.
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5 Division Rule Based Bankruptcy Rules
In Section 6, we show the independence of the axioms. To do so, we define a number
of bankruptcy rules in this section. The definition of the proportional rule for financial
networks is based on the proportional division rule for claims problems. We follow the
approach in Cso´ka and Herings (2016) to extend division rules for claims problems into
bankruptcy rules for financial networks. See also Groote Schaarsberg, Reijnierse, and Borm
(2013) for a related approach focusing on equity rather than payment matrices. We are
particularly interested in the constrained equal awards division rule and the constrained
equal losses division rule. Under the constrained equal awards division rule, all claimants
get the same amount, up to the value of their claim. The constrained equal losses division
rule is its dual and imposes that all claimants face the same loss, up to the value of their
claim.
In this section, it is convenient to allow for real-valued amounts. As a notational
convention, when confusion could arise, we use an asterisk as a superscript when a function
is defined on a real-valued domain and for sets of real-valued objects. Let some set of agents
N ∈ N be given. A division rule on the real domain is a function d∗ : R+×RN+ → RN+ such
that, for every j ∈ N, d∗j(E, c) ≤ cj and
∑
j∈N d
∗
j(E, c) = min{E,
∑
k∈N ck}. Moreover,
for every j ∈ N, d∗j is required to be weakly increasing in E. It is well-known that these
properties of d∗ imply it is continuous, see for instance Thomson (2003).
It is straightforward to extend the proportional division rule dp for rational-valued
claims problems of Section 2 to the proportional division rule d∗p for real-valued claims
problems. Another example of a division rule is the constraint equal awards division rule.
If E >
∑
j∈N cj, then define λ = maxj∈N cj. Otherwise, define λ ∈ [0,maxj∈N cj] as the
unique solution to∑
j∈N
min{cj, λ} = E.
The constrained equal awards division rule assigns to claimant j ∈ N the amount
d∗ceaj (E, c) = min{cj, λ}.
In a similar vein, if E >
∑
j∈N cj, then define µ = 0. Otherwise, define µ ∈ [0,maxj∈N cj]
as the unique solution to∑
j∈N
max{cj − µ, 0} = E.
The constrained equal losses division rule assigns to claimant j ∈ N the amount
d∗celj (E, c) = max{cj − µ, 0}.
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The set of all matrices in RN×N+ with a zero diagonal is denoted by M∗(N). The union
over all finite sets of agents of these matrices is denoted by M∗ = ∪N∈NM∗(N). The set
of all financial networks (N, z, L) with set of agents N ∈ N , endowments z ∈ RN++, and
liability matrix L ∈ M∗(N) is denoted by F∗. The definition of a bankruptcy rule on the
real domain is as follows.
Definition 5.1. A bankruptcy rule on the real domain is a function b∗ : F∗ → M∗ such
that for every (N, z, L) ∈ F∗ it holds that b∗(N, z, L) ∈M∗(N).
Using Definition 2.2 as based on d∗p, we can extend the proportional rule p for rational-
valued financial networks to a proportional rule p∗ : F∗ → M∗ for real-valued financial
networks. We can proceed in a similar way for general division rules. We extend the
definitions of asset value ai(N, z, P ) and equity ei(N, z, P ) in a straightforward way to the
real-valued setup.
Definition 5.2. Given a financial network (N, z, L) ∈ F∗ and division rules (d∗i)i∈N , the
payment matrix P ∈M∗(N) is a clearing payment matrix if it solves the following system
of equations:
Pij = d
∗i
j (ai(N, z, P ), Li), i, j ∈ N.
Unlike the case with proportional division rules, it is in general not guaranteed that
the clearing payment matrix is uniquely determined by Definition 5.2. However, we will
argue next that there is a uniquely defined least clearing payment matrix and a uniquely
defined greatest clearing payment matrix.
A lattice is a partially ordered set in which every pair of elements has a supremum
and an infimum. A complete lattice is a lattice in which every non-empty subset has a
supremum and an infimum. The proof of the following result relies on Tarski’s fixed point
theorem (Tarski, 1955) and follows from a straightforward adaptation of the proof for the
discrete case in Cso´ka and Herings (2016).
Theorem 5.3. Let a financial network (N, z, L) ∈ F∗ and division rules (d∗i)i∈N be given.
The set of clearing payment matrices is a complete lattice. In particular, there exists a
least clearing payment matrix P− and a greatest clearing payment matrix P+.
If all agents use proportional division rules, then it follows from Theorem 2 of Eisenberg
and Noe (2001) that the clearing payment matrix is unique. Surprisingly, when using the
constrained equal awards division rule for each agent, the clearing payment matrix need
not be unique.
Example 5.4. We consider a financial network (N, z, L) ∈ F∗ and division rules (d∗i)i∈N
with three agents N = {1, 2, 3} where d∗1 = d∗2 = d∗3 = d∗cea. Table 6 presents the
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endowments, the liabilities, the least clearing payment matrix P− and the greatest clearing
payment matrix P+ and the induced asset values and equities.
z L P− a(N, z, P−) e(N, z, P−) P+ a(N, z, P+) e(N, z, P+)
1 0 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 2 1 3 0
1 2 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 1 3 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 3 3
Table 6: The clearing payment matrices P− and P+ and their induced asset values and
equities using constrained equal awards division rules in Example 5.4 for the financial
network F = (N, z, L).
For financial networks, we select the greatest clearing payment matrix to define a
bankruptcy rule that is based on division rules for claims problems.
Definition 5.5. The bankruptcy rule b∗ : F∗ →M∗ is based on division rules (d∗i)i∈N if
for every F = (N, z, L) ∈ F∗ it holds that b∗(F ) = P+, where P+ is the greatest clearing
payment matrix for financial network F and division rules (d∗i)i∈N .
Using Definition 5.5 the constrained equal awards rule cea∗ : F∗ → M∗ follows when
all agents use the constrained equal awards division rule and the constrained equal losses
rule cel∗ : F∗ → M∗ when all agents use the constrained equal losses division rule. Not
every bankruptcy rule for financial networks is based on division rules. An example is the
pairwise netting proportional rule, where payments do not only depend on the asset value
of an agent and his liabilities, but also on his claims towards other agents.
The greatest clearing payment matrix corresponding to a bankruptcy rule that is based
on division rules for claims problems can be determined as the solution to a programming
problem. Let some financial network (N, z, L) ∈ F∗ and division rules (d∗i)i∈N be given.
The set of feasible payment matrices P∗ is defined as the set of payment matrices where
each row i belongs to the image of the division rule of agent i, that is
P∗ = {P ∈M∗(N) | ∀i ∈ N, Pi ∈ d∗i(R+, Li)}.
Theorem 5.6. Let b∗ : F∗ → M∗ be a bankruptcy rule that is based on division rules
(d∗i)i∈N. Let a financial network F = (N, z, L) ∈ F∗ be given. Then b∗(F ) = P+ if and
only if P+ solves the following programming problem:
maxP∈P∗
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N Pij,
subject to
z + P>1− P1 ≥ 0.
(5.1)
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Proof. Let P ′ be a solution to (5.1) and let some i ∈ N be given. We show that
P ′i = d
∗i(ai(N, z, P ′), Li) from which it follows that P ′ is a clearing payment matrix.
If P ′i = Li, then from the inequality in (5.1) we have that
ai(N, z, P
′) = zi +
∑
j∈N
P ′ji ≥
∑
j∈N
P ′ij =
∑
j∈N
Lij.
From the definition of a division rule, it now follows that d∗i(ai(N, z, P ′), Li) = Li.
Consider the case P ′i < Li. We show that ei(N, z, P
′) = 0. Suppose ei(N, z, P ′) > 0.
Since P ′ ∈ P∗ there exists E ′ ∈ R+ such that P ′i = d∗i(E ′, Li). Since d∗i is continuous and
ei(N, z, P
′) > 0 there exists ε > 0 such that
zi +
∑
j∈NP
′
ji −
∑
j∈Nd
∗i
j (E
′ + ε, Li) ≥ 0.
The payment matrix P ′′ defined by
P ′′i = d
∗i(E ′ + ε, Li),
P ′′j = P
′
j , j 6= i,
satisfies the constraints in (5.1) and leads to a strictly higher value of the objective function
than P ′, a contradiction. Consequently, it holds that ei(N, z, P ′) = 0.
Since P ′ ∈ P∗ there exists E ′ ∈ R+ such that P ′i = d∗i(E ′, Li) and from P ′i < Li and
the definition of a division rule, we have
∑
j∈N d
∗i
j (E
′, Li) = E ′. Since ei(N, z, P ′) = 0, we
therefore have that
E ′ =
∑
j∈N
d∗ij (E
′, Li) =
∑
j∈N
P ′ij = zi +
∑
j∈N
P ′ji = ai(N, z, P
′).
We have shown that P ′ is a clearing payment matrix.
Let P+ be the greatest clearing payment matrix, which exists by Theorem 5.3. Since
P+ satisfies feasibility and the constraint in (5.1), it follows that P ′ = P+. 2
For the constrained equal award rule cea∗ we can replace the requirement P ∈ P∗ of
the program in (5.1) by a set of simple constraints. Using Theorem 5.6, the following result
follows in a straightforward way.
Theorem 5.7. Let a financial network F = (N, z, L) ∈ F∗ be given. Then cea∗(F ) = P+ if
and only if there is λ+ ∈ RN+ such that (P+, λ+) solves the following programming problem:
maxP∈RN×N+ ,λ∈RN+
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N Pij,
subject to
Pij = min{λi, Lij}, i, j ∈ N,
λi ≤ maxj∈N Lij, i ∈ N,
z + P>1− P1 ≥ 0.
(5.2)
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The program in (5.2) maximizes the total payments as made by the agents subject
to three conditions. The first condition expresses that agent i pays all of his claimants
the amount λi, except when λi would exceed the value of the claim. This yields the
feasibility condition of clearing payment matrices under the constrained equal awards rule.
The second condition serves to pin down a unique value of λi in all circumstances. The
third condition requires that no agent end up with negative equity. The maximization of
the objective function guarantees that an agent only defaults if he has zero equity, since
otherwise the objective function could be increased. It also guarantees that the greatest
clearing payment matrix is selected.
The restriction cea∗|F of the constrained equal awards rule cea
∗ to rational-valued finan-
cial networks in F is denoted by cea. The next result establishes that for financial networks
F ∈ F , the payment matrix cea(F ) belongs to the rational payment matrices M(N), so
cea is well-defined.
Theorem 5.8. Let a financial network F = (N, z, L) ∈ F be given. It holds that cea(F ) ∈
M(N).
Proof. Let (P+, λ+) be the solution to the programming problem (5.2), so P+ =
cea∗(F ). Let A = {(i, j) ∈ N × N | P+ij = Lij} be the set of pairs of agents (i, j) such
that the liability of i to j is fully settled under P+. Let I be the set of agents such that
P+i = Li. Then (P
+, λ+) is the unique solution to the linear system of equations
Pij = Lij, i, j ∈ A,
Pij − λi = 0, (i, j) ∈ (N ×N) \ A,∑
j∈N Pij −
∑
j∈N Pji = zi, i ∈ N \ I.
Since all coefficients in this system of equations are rational and the system has a unique
solution, the solution must be rational too. We have shown that P+ ∈M(N). 2
Also for the constrained equal losses rule, we can replace the requirement P ∈ P∗ of
the program in (5.1) by a set of simple constraints. Using Theorem 5.3, we obtain the
following result in a straightforward way.
Theorem 5.9. Let a financial network F = (N, z, L) ∈ F∗ be given. Then cel∗(F ) = P+ if
and only if there is µ− ∈ RN+ such that (P+, µ−) solves the following programming problem:
maxP∈RN×N+ ,µ∈RN+
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N Pij,
subject to
Pij = max{Lij − µi, 0}, i, j ∈ N,
z + P>1− P1 ≥ 0.
(5.3)
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The program in (5.3) maximizes the total payments as made by the agents subject to
three conditions. The first condition expresses that agent i pays all of his claimants the
amount their claims minus µi, except when µi would exceed the value of the claim, corre-
sponding to the feasibility condition of clearing payment matrices under the constrained
equal losses rule. The second condition requires that no agent ends up with negative eq-
uity. The maximization of the objective function guarantees that agents only default if
they have zero equity and that the greatest clearing payment matrix is selected. Since for
every i ∈ N it holds that zi > 0, we have that µi < maxj∈N Lij.
The restriction cel∗|F of the constrained equal losses rule cel
∗ to financial networks in
F is denoted by cel. The next result establishes that for financial networks in F ∈ F ,
the payment matrix cel(F ) belongs to the rational payment matrices M(N), so cel is
well-defined.
Theorem 5.10. Let a financial network F = (N, z, L) ∈ F be given. It holds that cel(F ) ∈
M(N).
Proof. Let (P+, µ−) be the solution to the programming problem (5.3), so P+ =
cel∗(F ). Let A = {(i, j) ∈ N ×N | P+ij = Lij} be the set of pairs of agents (i, j) such that
the liability of i to j is fully settled under P+. Then (P+, µ−) is the unique solution to the
linear system of equations
Pij = Lij, i, j ∈ A,
Pij + µi = Lij, (i, j) ∈ (N ×N) \ A,∑
j∈N Pij −
∑
j∈N Pji = zi, i ∈ N \ I.
Since all coefficients in this system of equations are rational and the system has a unique
solution, the solution must be rational too. We have shown that P+ ∈M(N). 2
Although clearing payment matrices are not always unique, the resulting equities are.
For instance, in Example 5.4 it holds that the payment matrices P− and P+ lead to
the same equities. The following result is a modest generalization of a result in Groote
Schaarsberg, Reijnierse, and Borm (2013), who assume that all agents use the same division
rule. It is straightforward to extend their proof to the case where agents do not necessarily
use the same division rules.
Theorem 5.11. Let a financial network (N, z, L) ∈ F∗ and division rules (d∗i)i∈N be
given. Let P and P ′ be clearing payment matrices. Then it holds that, for every i ∈ N,
ei(N, z, P ) = ei(N, z, P
′).
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6 Independence of the Axioms
In this section, we show the independence of the axioms B, L, P, I, and N on the rational
domain by providing five examples of bankruptcy rules satisfying all the axioms except
one.
Example 6.1 (All except B). Consider the following bankruptcy rule based on the pro-
portional rule but pretending that the liabilities are twice the actual liabilities. Let
b1 : F →M be defined by setting b1(N, z, L) = p(N, z, 2L) for every (N, z, L) ∈ F .
Then b1 obviously does not satisfy B.
Recall that the proportional rule p satisfies L, P, I, and N by Theorem 4.1.
Since p satisfies L, P, and I, it follows almost immediately that b1 satisfies L, P, and I.
Since merging identical agents and then doubling the liability matrix leads to the same
liability matrix as doubling the liability matrix first and merging identical agents next, the
axiom of N for b1 follows from the axiom of N for p.
Example 6.2 (All except L). Consider the bankruptcy rule where all liabilities are paid.
Let b2 : F →M be defined by setting b2(N, z, L) = L for every (N, z, L) ∈ F .
Then b2 clearly does not satisfy L. Moreover, b2 obviously satisfies B, P, I, and N.
Example 6.3 (All except P). Consider the bankruptcy rule where nothing is paid. Let
b3 : F →M be defined by setting b3(N, z, L) = 0N×N .
Then b3 clearly does not satisfy P. Moreover, b3 obviously satisfies B, L, I, and N.
Example 6.4 (All except I). Consider the pairwise netting proportional rule pnp as defined
in Definition 2.5.
As we have seen in Example 2.6, pnp does not satisfy Axiom I.
Axiom B is obviously satisfied by pnp.
To check that pnp satisfies L, consider a financial network F = (N, z, L) ∈ F and any
agent i ∈ N . Then
ei(N, z, pnp(F )) = zi +
∑
j∈N pnpji(F )−
∑
j∈N pnpij(F )
= zi +
∑
j∈N min{Lji, Lij}+
∑
j∈N pji(N, z, L−min{L,L>})
−∑j∈N min{Lij, Lji} −∑j∈N pij(N, z, L−min{L,L>})
= ei(N, z, p(N, z, L−min{L,L>})) ≥ 0,
(6.1)
since the proportional rule p satisfies L. Thus pnp satisfies L.
To verify that pnp satisfies P, consider a financial network F = (N, z, L) ∈ F and any
agent i ∈ N such that pnpi(F ) < Li, implying that
pi(N, z, L−min{L,L>}) < Li −min{Li, (L>)i}. (6.2)
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Since p satisfies P, (6.2) implies that
ei(N, z, p(n, z, L−min{L,L>})) = 0.
Using the same argument as in (6.1), it follows that ei(N, z, pnp(F )) = 0, thus pnp satisfies
P.
To verify that pnp satisfies N, we define the bankruptcy rules b4 : F → M and b5 :
F → M by setting, for F = (N, z, L) ∈ F , b4(F ) = min{L,L>} and b5(F ) = p(N, z, L −
min{L,L>}). It holds that pnp(F ) = b4(F ) + b5(F ). We show that both b4(F ) and b5(F )
satisfy N, from which it follows that pnp satisfies N.
We use Definition 3.8 of Axiom N to verify that b4 satisfies N, since merging identical
agents will not change what they pay or receive in total by pairwise netting, and the
liabilities within pairs of unaffected agents are also not changed.
To show that b5 satisfies N, observe that merging identical agents first and execute
pairwise netting next leads to the same liability matrix as pairwise netting first and merging
identical agents next. Since p satisfies Axiom N, it follows next that b5 satisfies Axiom N.
Example 6.5 (All except N). Consider the constrained equal losses rule cel and its char-
acterization as a programming problem (5.3). The rule cel clearly does not satisfy N.
Axioms B, L and I follow from the constraints in the programming problem (5.9).
If there is a financial network F = (N, z, L) ∈ F and an agent i ∈ N such that ei(F ) > 0
and celi(F ) < Li, then the objective function of the programming problem (5.9) could be
increased, a contradiction. Thus cel satisfies P.
7 The Axiomatization on the Real Domain
In this section we show that the axioms of claims boundedness (B), limited liability (L),
priority of creditors (P), impartiality (I), non-manipulability by identical agents (N), and
Continuity (C) characterize the proportional rule p∗ for financial networks on the real
domain. We also argue that these axioms are independent.
The definition of the axioms of B, L, P, I, and N is extended to the real domain in
the straightforward way. Our last axiom is continuity. We endow F∗ with the standard
topology, based on the discrete topology for N and the Euclidean topology for endowments
and liabilities. Let (F n)n∈N = (Nn, zn, Ln)n∈N be a sequence of financial networks of F∗.
Notice that this sequence converges to the financial network F = (N, z, L) of F∗ if and
only if there is n′ ∈ N such that for every n ≥ n′ it holds that Nn = N, limn→∞ zn = z,
and limn→∞ Ln = L.
Definition 7.1. A bankruptcy rule b∗ : F∗ →M∗ satisfies the Axiom of continuity (C) if
b∗ is continuous.
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The following example shows that the constrained equal awards rule cea∗ does not
satisfy Axiom C.
Example 7.2. Consider a financial network (N, z, L) ∈ F∗ with three agents N = {1, 2, 3}.
Table 7 presents the endowments, the liabilities, and the payment matrix P resulting from
the constrained equal awards rule cea∗ and the induced asset values and equities. Agents
z L P a(N, z, P ) e(N, z, P )
1 0 2 1 0 2 1 3 0
1 2 0 1 2 0 1 3 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Table 7: The payment matrix, asset values, and equities resulting from the constrained
equal awards rule cea∗ in Example 7.2 for the financial network F = (N, z, L).
are all able to pay their liabilities, though agents 1 and 2 end up with zero equity.
Now, for ε > 0, consider the financial network F ε = (N, z, Lε) ∈ F∗ as displayed in
Table 8, where the liabilities of both agents 1 and 2 to agent 3 have gone up by ε.
z Lε P ε a(N, z, P ε) e(N, z, P ε)
1 0 2 1+ε 0 1 1 2 0
1 2 0 1+ε 1 0 1 2 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Table 8: The payment matrix, asset values, and equities resulting from the constrained
equal awards rule cea∗ in Example 7.2 for the financial network F ε = (N, z, Lε).
Since constrained equal awards requires the same payments from agent 1 to agents 2
and 3, up to their claims, agent 1 can pay at most one unit to both agents. The same is
true for the payments of agent 2 to agents 1 and 3. Under these payments, agents 1 and 2
end up with zero equity and default partially on all their liabilities. We have that
lim
ε↓0
cea∗(F ε) = lim
ε↓0
P ε =
 0 1 11 0 1
0 0 0
 6=
 0 2 12 0 1
0 0 0
 = P = cea∗(F ),
so while the financial networks F ε converge to F when ε tends to zero, the corresponding
payment matrices do not converge.
The lack of continuity of cea∗ in Example 7.2 is not resolved by making another selection
from the set of clearing payment matrices. The matrix P ε is the unique clearing payment
matrix for the financial network F ε when constrained equal award division rules are used.
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The financial network F has many clearing payment matrices compatible with constrained
equal award division rules. The greatest clearing payment matrix is equal to P and the least
clearing payment matrix is P ε. The following example shows that an alternative definition
of the constrained equal awards rule that selects the least clearing payment matrix would
not solve the lack of continuity.
Example 7.3. For ε > 0, consider the financial network F˜ ε = (N, zε, L) ∈ F∗ as displayed
in Table 9.
zε L P˜ ε a(N, zε, P˜ ε) e(N, zε, P˜ ε)
1+ε 0 2 1 0 2 1 3 + ε ε
1+ε 2 0 1 2 0 1 3 + ε ε
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Table 9: The payment matrix, asset values, and equities resulting from the constrained
equal awards rule cea∗ in Example 7.3 for the financial network F˜ ε = (N, zε, L).
The payment matrix P˜ ε is the unique clearing payment matrix in the financial network
F˜ ε under constrained equal award division rules. The financial networks F˜ ε tend to the
financial network F of Example 7.2 as ε goes to zero. The payment matrices P˜ ε are all
equal to cea∗(F ). Selecting the least clearing payment matrix for F under constrained equal
awards division rules instead of the greatest clearing payment matrix cea∗(F ) would then
lead to a violation of continuity in this example.
The next result shows that the proportional rule as defined on the real domain satisfies
all our axioms.
Theorem 7.4. The proportional rule p∗ satisfies B, L, P, I, N, and C.
Proof. The proof that p∗ satisfies B, L, P, I, and N is analogous to the corresponding
proof of Theorem 4.1.
We now prove that p∗ satisfies C. Let (F n)n∈N = (Nn, zn, Ln)n∈N be a sequence of
financial networks of F∗, which converges to the financial network F = (N, z, L) of F∗. We
have to show that the payment matrix defined by P n = p∗(F n) converges to the payment
matrix p∗(F ).
Without loss of generality, we can assume that, for every n ∈ N, Nn = N and that, for
every i, j ∈ N, Lnij > 0 if Lij > 0. Also, using the boundedness of the sequence (P n)n∈N,
we can assume without loss of generality that it has a limit P ∈M∗(N). For every n ∈ N,
it holds by definition of p∗ that
P nij =
{
0, if Lnij = 0,
min{ Lnij∑
k∈N L
n
ik
ai(N, z
n, P n), Lnij}, otherwise.
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Let i, j ∈ N be such that Lij = 0. It holds that
P ij = lim
n→∞
P nij ≤ lim
n→∞
Lnij = Lij = 0.
Let i, j ∈ N be such that Lij > 0. Now it holds that
P ij = lim
n→∞
P nij = lim
n→∞
min{ Lnij∑
k∈N L
n
ik
ai(N, z
n, P n), Lnij} = min{ Lij∑
k∈N Lik
ai(N, z, P ), Lij}.
We have shown that P is a solution to the system of equations (2.2) corresponding to
the financial network F . Since this solution is unique by Theorem 2 of Eisenberg and Noe
(2001), it follows that P = p∗(F ) as desired. 2
We show next that if a bankruptcy rule satisfies the axioms of B, L, P, I, N, and C,
then it must be the proportional rule.
Theorem 7.5. If the bankruptcy rule b∗ satisfies B, L, P, I, N, and C, then b∗ = p∗.
Proof. Let b∗ be a bankruptcy rule satisfying B, L, P, I, N, and C. It follows from
Theorem 4.4 that for every F ∈ F we have that b∗(F ) = p(F ) = p∗(F ).
Let F ∈ F∗ be a financial network and let (F n)n∈N be a sequence of financial networks
in F , so with rational endowments and liabilities, converging to F . We have that
b∗(F ) = lim
n→∞
b∗(F n) = lim
n→∞
p∗(F n) = p∗(F ),
where the first equality follows from b∗ satisfying C, the second follows since F n ∈ F , and
the third since p∗ satisfies C by Theorem 7.4. 2
The following corollary follows immediately from Theorems 7.4 and 7.5.
Corollary 7.6. The proportional rule p∗ is the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying the axioms
of B, L, P, I, N, and C.
To show that the axioms are independent on the real domain, we make use of the rules
in Examples 6.1-6.5. We also provide a rule which does not satisfy C but satisfies B, L,
P, I, and N. It is easily verified that all the axioms satisfied by the rules in Examples 6.1-
6.5 extend to the real domain. It is also easy to show that the extension of the rules
in Examples 6.1-6.4 satisfy Axiom C. To show that the extension cel∗ of cel as used in
Example 6.5 satisfies Axiom C, we first show that the use of constrained equal losses
division rules leads to a uniquely defined clearing payment matrix.
Theorem 7.7. Let a financial network (N, z, L) ∈ F∗ and constrained equal losses division
rules (d∗cel)i∈N be given. Then there is a unique clearing payment matrix.
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Proof. By Theorem 5.3 there exists a least clearing payment matrix P− and a greatest
clearing payment matrix P+. Let µ+, µ− ∈ RN+ be such that
P−ij = max{Lij − µ+i , 0}, i, j ∈ N,
P+ij = max{Lij − µ−i , 0}, i, j ∈ N.
Notice that P− ≤ P+ and µ− ≤ µ+.
Suppose that the clearing payment matrix is not unique, that is,
µ− < µ+. (7.1)
By Theorem 5.11 it holds that
ei(N, z, P
−) = ei(N, z, P+), i ∈ N. (7.2)
Using the definition of a division rule, if i ∈ N is such that ei(N, z, P−) = ei(N, z, P+) > 0,
then µ−i = µ
+
i = 0. The set of agents with zero equity is denoted by
N0 = {i ∈ N | ei(N, z, P−) = ei(N, z, P+) = 0}.
The inequality in (7.1) implies that there is an agent i1 ∈ N0 such that
µ−i1 < µ
+
i1
. (7.3)
Since the positive endowment zi1 of agent i1 must end up somewhere, there is a finite
sequence of agents (i1, . . . , im) such that
P−i`i`+1 = Li`i`+1 − µ+i` > 0, ` = 1, . . . ,m− 1, (7.4)
ei1(N, z, P
−) = · · · = eim−1(N, z, P−) = 0 and eim(N, z, P−) > 0, (7.5)
so agent i` pays a positive amount to agent i`+1 and agent im has positive equity. Using
the fact that P− ≤ P+ and (7.2), it also holds that
P+i`i`+1 = Li`i`+1 − µ−i` > 0, ` = 1, . . . ,m− 1, (7.6)
ei1(N, z, P
+) = · · · = eim−1(N, z, P+) = 0 and eim(N, z, P+) > 0. (7.7)
We now show by induction that
µ−i` < µ
+
i`
, ` = 1, . . . ,m− 1. (7.8)
For ` = 1, (7.8) follows from (7.3).
Assume that (7.8) holds for some ` ≤ m− 2. We will show that it also holds for `+ 1.
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By (7.5) and (7.7), agent i`+1 has zero equity in both P
− and P+, thus∑
j∈N max{Li`+1j − µ+i`+1 , 0} = zi`+1 +
∑
j∈N max{Lji`+1 − µ+j , 0}, (7.9)∑
j∈N max{Li`+1j − µ−i`+1 , 0} = zi`+1 +
∑
j∈N max{Lji`+1 − µ−j , 0}. (7.10)
We argue that the right-hand side of (7.10) is strictly greater than that of (7.9). Since
µ− ≤ µ+, we have that
max{Lji`+1 − µ−j , 0} ≥ max{Lji`+1 − µ+j , 0}, j ∈ N,
It also holds that
max{Li`i`+1 − µ−i` , 0} = Li`i`+1 − µ−i` > Li`i`+1 − µ+i` = max{Li`i`+1 − µ+i` , 0},
where the first equality follows from 7.6, the inequality by the induction hypothesis, and
the last equality from (7.4).
The left-hand side of (7.10) is then also strictly greater than that of (7.9), so∑
j∈N max{Li`+1j − µ−i`+1 , 0} >
∑
j∈N max{Li`+1j − µ+i`+1 , 0}, (7.11)
implying that
µ−i`+1 < µ
+
i`+1
.
This completes the proof of (7.8). In particular, we have that
µ−im−1 < µ
+
im−1 . (7.12)
Finally, we have that
eim(N, z, P
+)− eim(N, z, P−)
=
∑
j∈N max{Ljim − µ−j , 0} −
∑
j∈N max{Limj − µ−im , 0}
−∑j∈N max{Ljim − µ+j , 0}+∑j∈N max{Limj − µ+im , 0}
=
∑
j∈N max{Ljim − µ−j , 0} −
∑
j∈N max{Ljim − µ+j , 0}
> 0,
where the second equality follows from µ−im = µ
+
im
= 0 and the inequality follows from
µ− ≤ µ+, (7.4) and (7.6) for ` = m − 1, and (7.12). We have obtained a contradiction to
(7.2). Consequently, it follows that the clearing payment matrix is unique. 2
The result of Theorem 7.7 for constrained equal losses division rules is in stark contrast
with the case of constrained equal awards division rules as demonstrated by Example 5.4.
This is surprising since both division rules can be considered as each other’s dual and
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share many common features, see Thomson (2003). The proof of Theorem 7.7 cannot be
adjusted to deal with the case of constrained equal awards division rules. As can be verified
in Example 5.4, it is not true that agent 1 and agent 2 make a strictly higher payment to
agent 3 when comparing P+ to P−. Therefore, the last step in the proof of Theorem 7.7
does not hold for the case of constrained equal awards division rules.
Theorem 7.8. The constrained equal losses rule cel∗ satisfies C.
Proof. Let (F n)n∈N = (Nn, zn, Ln)n∈N be a sequence of financial networks of F∗ that
converges to the financial network F = (N, z, L) of F∗. We have to show that the payment
matrix defined by P n = cel∗(F n) converges to the payment matrix cel∗(F ).
Without loss of generality, we can assume that, for every n ∈ N, Nn = N. Also, using
the boundedness of the sequence (P n)n∈N, we can assume without loss of generality that it
has a limit P ∈M∗(N). For every n ∈ N, it holds by definition of cel∗ that
P nij = d
∗cel
j (ai(N, z
n, P n), Li), i, j ∈ N.
We have that
P ij = lim
n→∞
P nij = lim
n→∞
d∗celj (ai(N, z
n, P n), Li) = d
∗cel
j (ai(N, z, P ), Li), i, j ∈ N,
where the third equality uses that d∗celj and ai are continuous. It follows that P is a clear-
ing payment matrix for the financial network F and constrained equal losses division rules
(d∗cel)i∈N . By Theorem 7.7, P is also the greatest clearing payment matrix and therefore
equal to cel∗(F ) by definition of cel∗. 2
We complete the section by presenting a bankruptcy rule which does not satisfy C but
satisfies B, L, P, I, and N.
Example 7.9 (All except C). Let d∗irr be the division rule that gives priority to claims
that belong to R\Q over claims that belong to Q and makes proportional payments within
each of the two priority classes. Let b∗6 : F∗ →M∗ be the bankruptcy rule that is based
on (d∗irr)i∈N. The bankruptcy rule b∗6 obviously satisfies B, L, P, and I.
Axiom N for b∗6 is satisfied, since the take-over of a set of agents K that are identical
to agent j does not affect the priority class of the liabilities of agent j after the take-over.
Technically, the addition of a finite number of rational numbers results in a rational number
and the addition of a finite number of irrational numbers results in an irrational number.
To verify that b∗6 satisfies N then follows the reasoning for p∗.
The fact that b∗6 does not satisfy C follows easily from the fact that d∗irr is not con-
tinuous in the vector of claims c. For instance, consider the case where one entry of c is a
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positive rational number and another entry is a positive irrational number. For a sequence
of claims vectors with only rational entries that converges to c, it is only at the limit that
the irrational claim gets priority.
8 Conclusion
Many real-life bankruptcy problems are characterized by network aspects, meaning that
the default of one agent can potentially snowball and lead to a chain of contagion defaults
of other agents. As a consequence, the estates to be divided are endogenously determined,
which makes the problem quite different from the typical case as studied in the axiomatic
bankruptcy literature. The most important bankruptcy rule from a practical perspective
is the proportional rule. This makes an axiomatic analysis of the proportional bankruptcy
rule in financial networks imperative.
An important aspect of actual bankruptcy problems is that entities can merge or create
spin-offs. When such activities do not generate added value, they should not influence the
payments to and from other entities and the payments between other entities. Such a
property is known as non-manipulability. We show that an unrestricted ability to form
mergers or create spin-offs clashes with non-manipulability. Intuitively, an entity would
have incentives to create a spin-off that contains all liabilities, while keeping all assets
for itself. We consider a much less demanding non-manipulability property, called non-
manipulability by identical agents. In this case, only mergers of identical entities or the
split of an entity into a number of identical ones should not affect payments.
Our other main substantive axiom is impartiality, requiring that two agents with the
same claim on an agent should receive the same payment from him. We show that the two
main axioms lead to the proportional rule when complemented by the axioms of claims
boundedness, limited liability, priority of creditors, and continuity. Continuity can be
dropped when assuming that all endowments, assets, and liabilities occurring in financial
networks are represented by rational numbers rather than reals. We show all axioms to be
independent.
We believe that the widespread use of the proportional rule in bankruptcy situations
across countries and over time, see Engle (2012) for a historical account of the popularity
of the proportional rule, is intimately related to the attractiveness and simplicity of the
axioms characterizing it.
Table 10 summarizes the bankruptcy rules used in this paper and the axioms that they
satisfy.
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B L P I N C
Proportional p∗
√ √ √ √ √ √
Constrained equal awards cea∗
√ √ √ √ ¬ ¬
Constrained equal losses cel∗
√ √ √ √ ¬ √
Pairwise netting proportional pnp∗
√ √ √ ¬ √ √
Extension of b1 of Example 6.1, b∗1 ¬ √ √ √ √ √
Extension of b2 of Example 6.2, b∗2
√ ¬ √ √ √ √
Extension of b3 of Example 6.3, b∗3
√ √ ¬ √ √ √
Example 7.9, b∗6
√ √ √ √ √ ¬
Table 10: Bankruptcy rules and their properties
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